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Lloyd and the Legislative Void:
Representative Actions in Transatlantic Context
Suzanne Chiodo, Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School
Abstract: The Canadian class action regimes have had a strong influence on the development
of collective redress procedures in England. Canadian class proceedings legislation provided a
model for the competition law class action regime in the UK, and before then, it featured
prominently in the Civil Justice Council’s report that recommended the enactment of generic
class actions legislation in England. It is fitting, then, that the UK Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Lloyd v Google referred to the Canadian jurisprudence on the representative rule,
which allows one or more claimants to represent a group with the ‘same interest’. While Lloyd
did not follow the Supreme Court of Canada in allowing representative actions for
individualised damages, the decision represents a more liberal reading of the representative
rule than in previous cases. Specifically, it affirms the use of the rule for a declaration of the
answers to common questions, with individual actions to follow (the ‘bifurcated approach’).
This article will situate Lloyd within the context of Canadian and English representative action
jurisprudence, and, based on the rule’s development in Canada, will make predictions for its
use in England. Article length: 9,963 words.
Introduction
The Canadian1 class action regimes have had a strong influence on the development of
collective redress procedures in England.2 In its landmark judgment in Merricks v Mastercard,
the UK Supreme Court (UKSC) ‘regard[ed] the Canadian jurisprudence as persuasive in the
UK not only because of the greater experience of their courts in the conduct of class actions
but also because of the substantial similarity of purpose underlying both their legislation and
ours.’3 Canadian class proceedings legislation provided a model for the UK’s competition law
class action regime,4 and before then, it featured prominently in the Civil Justice Council’s
report that recommended the enactment of generic class actions legislation5 in England.6

1

References to ‘Canada’ include the provinces, territories, and the federal level.
References to ‘England’ are to the jurisdiction of England and Wales.
3
Mastercard Incorporated & Ors v Walter Hugh Merricks CBE [2020] UKSC 51 [42].
4
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Final Impact Assessment (January 2013) [194]; Competition
Act 1998, s 47, as amended by Schedule 8 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, 2015 c 15 (CA 1998).
5
‘Class actions’ are a procedure in which a representative claimant commences litigation on behalf of a defined
class, whereby all individuals who meet the definition are included unless they opt out. Class actions legislation
usually allows for individual damages claims, which differentiates them from representative actions. They can
encompass one sector or be generic.
6
Civil Justice Council, Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions (CJC 2008).
2

It is fitting, then, that England’s recent representative action jurisprudence has referred
extensively to the Canadian experience. The representative action is a rule of procedure that
allows one or more claimants to represent a group with the ‘same interest’.7 It originated in the
Court of Chancery and exists in various forms in most Commonwealth jurisdictions. In Canada,
it formed the basis for class actions at common law (and, indirectly, by statute).8 It was most
recently considered by the UKSC in Lloyd v Google,9 and the hope of many reformers was that
Canada’s experience would be repeated in England. It was not. Nevertheless, Lloyd represents
a more liberal reading of the representative rule than in previous decisions. Specifically, it
affirms the use of the rule for a declaration of the answers to common questions, with individual
actions to follow (the ‘bifurcated approach’).
Where does that leave England’s representative rule? This article will situate Lloyd
within the context of Canadian and English representative action jurisprudence, and, based on
its development in Canada, will make predictions for the use of the rule in England. In Part I,
I explain what a representative action is, and discuss Lloyd in that context. Part II articulates
how the courts in England and Canada have historically taken a very restrictive view of the
rule, such that it has generally only been available where groups have pursued their collective,
indivisible rights. Canadian representative action jurisprudence has largely been forgotten in
favour of class actions, but in providing an explanation of how class actions developed in that
country, it remains significant to law reformers in England and elsewhere. Part III describes
how the rule has evolved in Canada, including the Supreme Court of Canada’s Dutton decision
that permitted the use of the representative rule for class actions for damages. I articulate how

7

CPR 19.6; Rachael Mulheron, ‘From representative rule to class action: steps rather than leaps’ (2005) 24 CJQ
424, 427. As Mulheron points out, the other requirement of the rule is that ‘more than one person’ has an interest
in the claim.
8
Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc v Dutton, 2001 SCC 46. Following the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decision in Dutton, most of the remaining Canadian provinces enacted class proceedings legislation. Dutton was
part of a trilogy that provided guidance on class actions principles. The other two judgments were Hollick v
Toronto (City), 2001 SCC 68, and Rumley v British Columbia, 2001 SCC 69.
9
Lloyd v Google LLC [2021] UKSC 50.

Lloyd stopped short of doing this. Part IV examines how the rule can be used in England now,
compared to other collective redress procedures – specifically, the competition law class action
regime and the Group Litigation Order (GLO) framework.10 Part V concludes with some
predictions about the future of England’s representative rule. Numerous data protection actions
were commenced prior to the Lloyd judgment. That decision has rendered the rule impractical
for data protection claims, although there are other, limited, circumstances in which it may be
used.
Part I: The Representative Rule and Lloyd
The representative rule first emerged in 13th century England11 and continues today in CPR
19.6. In the course of its evolution, it was exported to common-law Canada, the US, and
throughout the British Empire.
The rule began as a flexible tool of procedure. Common law courts saw litigation in
individual terms and therefore took a narrow view of the joinder rule. They held that individuals
could only be joined to a proceeding if they consented and if their immediate interests would
be affected. The Court of Chancery took a wider view. It sought to adjudicate the rights not
only of persons before the court, but also of all those who would be affected by the dispute.
Equity therefore called for the compulsory joinder of all interested persons, so any judgment
would bind them all and ‘to prevent multiplicity of suits.’12 However, the compulsory joinder
rule threatened to prevent the parties from ‘coming at justice’13 if it was not possible or
practicable to join to the suit all who would be affected. Equity therefore allowed for the

10

CPR Part 19.III.
Stephen Yeazell, ‘Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action’ (1977) 77(6)
Colum L Rev 866.
12
How v The Tenants of Bromsgrove (1681) 23 ER 277.
13
Duke of Bedford v Ellis [1901] AC 1 (HL) 8.
11

representative action so that one person could represent all those interested, and any judgment
would bind all of them.14
Following the fusion of the courts in England,15 representative actions could be brought
at common law under Rule 10, which directed that:
Where there are numerous parties having the same interest in one
action, one or more of such parties may sue or be sued, or may be
authorised by the court to defend in such action, on behalf or for the
benefit of all parties so interested.16
The equivalent rule in Canada (except Québec)17 was substantially the same. The rule is similar
to class actions, in that they both involve groups represented by one or more claimants. They
are also both ‘opt out’: the persons represented are bound by any judgment unless they take
affirmative steps to opt out, making the class much bigger than in an opt-in action.18 However,
there are important distinctions between the two procedures, discussed further below. While in
all Canadian jurisdictions (except the territories) the use of the rule has led to the introduction
of class proceedings,19 the situation in England has been quite different. Because of the
restrictive interpretation of the rule there, it has remained a ‘procedural backwater’.20
The infrequency with which the rule was used, its restrictive interpretation, and the
complexity and cost of representative actions, meant that it was not widely regarded as realistic
for multi-party litigation when the latter rose in prominence in England in the 1980s.21 In his
Access to Justice Report, Lord Woolf acknowledged the inadequacy of the representative

14

Suzanne Chiodo, The Class Actions Controversy: The Origins and Development of the Ontario Class
Proceedings Act (Irwin Law 2018) 16.
15
Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873 (UK) 36 & 37 Vict, c 66 (SCJA 1873); Supreme Court of Judicature
Act 1875 (UK) 38 & 39 Vict c 77.
16
Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure, being scheduled to SCJA 1873, ibid.
17
Québec has never had a representative rule.
18
Lloyd (n 9) [27].
19
All the provinces now have class proceedings legislation, and class proceedings are also available at the federal
level under the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, Part 5.1.
20
CJC 2008 (n 6) 165.
21
Jillaine Seymour, ‘Representative Procedures and the Future of Multi-Party Actions’ (1999) 62 MLR 564;
Supreme Court Procedure Committee, Guide for use in Group Actions (HMSO 1991) 16-17.

rule.22 He noted that there was no specific procedure dealing with multi-party actions, and that
the mass litigation of the 1980s and 1990s had revealed the weaknesses of the system in dealing
with group claims.23 As a result, he recommended a new procedure, the Multi-Party Situation
(MPS), a version of which was enacted in 2000 as the GLO.24 Following the changes to the
civil procedure rules based on Lord Woolf’s Report, the representative rule continues to be
available under CPR 19.6. The ‘same interest’ requirement remains:25
(1) Where more than one person has the same interest in a claim –
(a) the claim may be begun; or
(b) the court may order that the claim be continued,
by or against one or more of the persons who have the same interest
as representatives of any other persons who have that interest.
Consultation papers that subsequently advocated for class action reform acknowledged that the
rule continued to be construed narrowly.26
It was in this context that the UKSC released its judgment in Lloyd.27 The class in Lloyd
consisted of an estimated 4.4 million users of the Safari Internet browser. It was claimed that
Google had collected their personal information without their consent, in breach of its duty
under section 4(4) of the Data Protection Act 1998.28 The representative wished to serve the
claim out of the jurisdiction, and this required the court to determine whether there was a ‘real
prospect of success’ and a ‘good arguable case’ that damage had been sustained within the
jurisdiction.29 This raised the substantive legal question of the meaning of ‘damage’ under s 13
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Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and
Wales (HMSO 1996).
23
ibid Chapter 17.
24
CPR Part 19.III. The opt-out features of the MPS were not enacted in the GLO: Mark Mildred, ‘Group Actions’
in Andrew Grubb and Geraint G Howells (eds), The Law of Product Liability (Butterworths 2000) 398.
25
The conversion of the old representative rule to the CPR has involved some changes in terminology, but not in
substance: Mildred, ibid 397.
26
CJC 2008 (n 6) 34.
27
Lloyd (n 9).
28
1998, c 29 (DPA 1998).
29
Lloyd v Google, [2018] EWHC 2599 (QB) [33]-[36].

of the DPA 1998, and the procedural question of whether the action was properly constituted
under the representative rule.
According to the rule’s jurisprudence, discussed below, an action for damages cannot
proceed if it requires an individualised assessment of the damage sustained by each class
member. The UKSC confirmed this, stating that the scope for claiming damages in a
representative action is limited by the compensatory principle which underlies damages for a
civil wrong – that is, the object of putting the claimant in the same position as if the wrong had
not occurred. Because damages are usually different for each individual, that means a claim
for damages usually requires an individualised assessment and is therefore unsuitable for
representative treatment.30
The claimant in Lloyd attempted to circumvent this by stating that each class member
had experienced loss of control of their data, and this qualified as ‘damage’ for the purposes of
s 13 of the DPA 1998. He argued that a uniform per capita sum of £750 could be awarded per
class member, which would represent the ‘lowest common denominator’ of individualised
damage (because some class members would have experienced additional loss consequential
upon the loss of control).
The UKSC did not accept this argument. It interpreted ‘damage’ under s 13 of the DPA
to require financial loss or mental distress, and not merely loss of control. It held that even if
the claimant’s interpretation was correct, the ‘loss of control’ analysis would require a
determination of Google’s processing of the data in each individual case to determine the
damages to be awarded (and any ‘lowest common denominator’ measure would result in de
minimis damages that would not be recoverable).31 Because the effect of the defendant’s
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Lloyd (n 9) [80].
M Brooks, ‘The Future of Data Breach Class Actions After the Supreme Court’s Ruling in Lloyd v Google’
(W Legal, 4 January 2022) <https://wlegal.co.uk/the-future-of-data-breach-class-actions-after-the-supremecourts-ruling-in-lloyd-v-google> accessed 16 February 2022.
31

actions was not uniform across the class,32 any attempt to cap class members’ damages, as the
claimant had done, contravened the compensatory principle. In order to comply with that
principle, the Supreme Court held that individualised enquiries were necessary and damages
could not therefore be pursued as part of the representative action.33
Despite this conclusion, Lloyd’s interpretation of the ‘same interest’ requirement is
expansive in several ways. First, the court held that the ‘same interest’ test must not be rigidly
applied or taken out of context.34 The test articulated in Duke of Bedford v Ellis35 was that the
class must have a common interest, a common grievance, and seek relief beneficial to all.36 As
discussed in the next section, prior jurisprudence interpreted the test as a fairly rigid tripartite
requirement that only allowed the representative rule to be used for the litigation of rights held
by a group – that is, indivisible rights – and not individually-held private rights.37 According
to this restrictive approach, even if the rights were identical, they would not meet the ‘same
interest’ test if one class member could sue on her own rights without affecting the rights of
any other class member. This was the situation in Lloyd, where redress arising from the very
same data breach had in fact been pursued in individual cases.38
However, the court in Lloyd reviewed the 20th century jurisprudence and found that
Ellis should not be interpreted as laying down a tripartite test.39 Furthermore, the court held
that separate causes of action are not a bar to a representative claim,40 and can be pursued where
damages can be assessed in the aggregate without the need for individual enquiries,41 or where
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Lloyd (n 9) [87].
ibid [80]-[87].
34
ibid [70].
35
Ellis (n 13).
36
ibid 8.
37
Smith v Cardiff Corpn [1954] 1 QB 210.
38
Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2016] QB 1003.
39
Lloyd (n 9) [71].
40
ibid [80].
41
ibid [82].
33

the rule is used for a declaration on the common questions, with individual issues regarding
liability or damages to be answered in individual claims to be commenced separately.42
This latter course is the second mark of the court’s expansive interpretation. Prior
jurisprudence regarded the bifurcated approach (pursued in Prudential Assurance)43 as having
been overturned by the Court of Appeal in Emerald Supplies.44 However, the UKSC in Lloyd
held that the Emerald court only refused to follow the bifurcated approach because of the way
the class was defined in that case.45 The court held that Prudential remains good law and
‘mark[s] a welcome revival of the spirit of flexibility which characterised the old case law.’46
Finally, the UKSC held that the ‘same interest’ requirement ‘needs to be interpreted
purposively in light of the overriding objective of the civil procedure rules and the rationale for
the representative procedure.’47 Crucially, the court held that many of the considerations
included in the overriding objective will militate in favour of allowing a representative action
to proceed.48 It concluded that, in the absence of class action legislation, the representative rule
had to be interpreted in a liberal and purposive manner.49
The court’s interpretation of the ‘same interest’ test was a departure from the restrictive
approach pursued throughout the 20th century. The next section will discuss this approach and
how it was reflected in Canada and England.

42

ibid [48], [80]-[81].
Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1981] Ch 229, 255 (overturned on other grounds: [1981]
Ch 204 (CA)). The Supreme Court of New Zealand endorsed a similar approach in Southern Response Earthquake
Services Limited v Ross [2020] NZSC 126.
44
Emerald Supplies v British Airways Plc [2010] EWCA Civ 1284 [6], [65].
45
Lloyd (n 9) [58]; Rachael Mulheron, ‘Emerald Supplies Ltd v British Airways Plc’ (2009) 8 Comp Law 159.
46
Lloyd, ibid [48].
47
Lloyd, ibid [71]; CPR 1.1(1).
48
CPR 1.1(2); Lloyd, ibid [75].
49
Lloyd, ibid [68], [71].
43

Part II: The Restrictive Approach
In England until recently, and in Canada until the 1970s, the courts took a narrow approach to
the representative rule. It is this approach that differentiates the rule from a class action, and
prevents ‘easily analogies between’ the two.50 According to the restrictive approach, a case can
only properly proceed as a representative action if it pursues rights held by a group as a group,
and if the relief sought is either equitable or involves damages claimed from a common fund
or that are easily quantifiable in the aggregate (so that no class member is over- or undercompensated). These two requirements will be discussed in turn.
First, the case must involve rights possessed by a group as a whole, and not individual
private rights. These rights are, by definition, indivisible – for example, rights to the use of
land.51 The wrong to be redressed must involve a breach of those collective rights. As the court
held in Markt, discussed below, a representative action cannot be brought if there is no common
right.52 In some older cases, that meant that individual contracts with the defendant were fatal
to a representative action.53 In later cases, however, courts allowed a representative action to
proceed if the individual contracts were identical; it was the differences between the terms or
formation of the contracts that were fatal.54 In the English case of The Irish Rowan, for
example,55 a ship owner brought a representative action seeking indemnity from a group of
insurers for the payment of cargo claims.56 The Court of Appeal held the action could proceed,
despite the existence of numerous separate contracts, because the contracts were identical and
there was no dispute as to the proportionate shares of liability and the damages payable.57 The

50

Yeazell (n 11) 876.
Guarantee Co v Caisse Populaire de Shippagan et al (1988), 86 NBR (2d) 342 [22] (NBQB).
52
Markt & Co, Ltd v Knight Steamship Co, Ltd [1910] 2 KB 1021 (CA), 1029-1030, 1040.
53
Shields v Mayor, [1953] 1 DLR 776 (OCA).
54
Stephenson v Air Canada, 1979 CanLII 1896 (ONSC); Naken et al v General Motors of Canada Ltd et al,
[1983] 1 SCR 72, 96, 103-104.
55
Irish Shipping Ltd v Commercial Union Assurance Co Plc (The Irish Rowan) [1990] 2 QB 206 (CA).
56
ibid 216.
57
ibid 227, 244.
51

court in Lloyd also held that a representative action could be pursued for the breach of
individually-held rights, stating that it is not a bar to a representative action that each class
member has a separate cause of action, or that damages are being claimed.58
Similarly, the Canadian courts’ position on this point softened in the late 20th century.
In Stephenson v Air Canada, for example, the Ontario Superior Court held that rights under
individual contracts could be pursued as part of a representative action, but not if the
circumstances of those contracts differed between class members.59 In Kelly, too, the court held
that a representative action could be brought for the breach of individually held rights.60
The second element of the restrictive approach is that the relief claimed must flow to
the group as a whole; it cannot involve individual damage awards personal to each class
member.61 Relief that is suitable for representative actions includes declaratory relief or
aggregate damages. The latter can be pursued only if the damages can be calculated on a group
basis, without reference to individual circumstances.62 If the claimants do not have the same
interest in the remedy, then there is a risk of over- or under-compensation and the representative
action cannot proceed. Later English cases suggest that if damages can be accurately calculated
for the group as a whole, then difficulties with determining individual entitlements will not bar
a representative action, because what the class members do with any global damages award is
a matter between them and does not involve the defendants.63 Furthermore, where damage is
an element of the cause of action, and some group members may have sustained damages
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Lloyd (n 9) [80].
Stephenson (n 54).
60
Kelly et al v Lacey (JJ) Insurance Ltd (Bankrupt), 1997 CanLII 16039 (NLSC) [15]-[16], [43].
61
Rachael Mulheron, ‘Creating, and Distributing, Common Funds Under the English Representative Rule’ (2021)
32(3) King’s LJ 381, 392-393.
62
Millharbour Management Ltd v Weston Homes Ltd [2011] 3 All ER 1027 [22].
63
EMI Records v Riley [1981] 1 WLR 923 (Ch) 926; Independiente Ltd v Music Trading On-Line (HK) Ltd [2003]
EWHC 470 (Ch) [28].
59

whereas others may not, the defendant will have different defences against different group
members and the ‘same interest’ requirement will not be met.64
These factors mark the main differences between a representative action and a class
action. Put simply, a representative action has traditionally involved one communal claim,
rather than (as in a class action) an aggregation of individual claims.
The characteristics discussed above found their expression in the strict tripartite test for
the ‘same interest’ that courts took from Lord Macnaghten’s phrase in Ellis: ‘[g]iven a common
interest and a common grievance, a representative suit was in order if the relief sought was in
its nature beneficial to all whom the plaintiff proposed to represent.’65 Ellis involved growers
of fresh produce who sought a declaration of their statutory right to sell their wares in Covent
Garden Market, as well as other remedies. While the growers did not have a joint proprietary
interest and were held to be a ‘large and fluctuating class’, it was a class nevertheless ‘capable
of being ascertained’.66 This was because the class was defined as sellers of produce they had
grown themselves, who were entitled to preferential rights under the relevant statute (thus
creating a common interest).67 They were claiming a breach of those statutory rights that were
conferred on them because of their identity, and the relief claimed, which was the same across
the group, also arose from that identity. A majority of the House of Lords therefore found in
the growers’ favour.
It was in the subsequent decision in Markt that the Court of Appeal interpreted Ellis as
laying down a tripartite test.68 In that case, Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton took Lord
Macnaghten’s phrase to mean that, ‘where the claim of the plaintiff is for damages the
machinery of a representative suit is absolutely inapplicable. The relief that he is seeking is a
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Rendlesham Estates plc v Barr Ltd [2014] EWHC 3968 (TCC) [88]-[92], [270]; Seafarers International Union
of Canada et al v Lawrence, 1979 CanLII 2110 (ONCA).
65
Ellis (n 13) 8.
66
ibid 5.
67
ibid 13, 16.
68
Markt (n 52) 1035.

personal relief … and does not benefit in any way the class for whom he purports to be bringing
the action.’69 In Markt, the plaintiffs sued on behalf of 44 other shippers for goods that had
been damaged when a Russian warship destroyed the defendant’s vessel. The court found the
group did not meet the Ellis test because they did not have a common interest (each had separate
contracts with the defendant), they did not share a common grievance (each had different
damages), and relief would not be beneficial to all (the damages sought were personal to each
shipper).70
The Canadian courts also applied this restrictive interpretation of the ‘same interest’
test, which revolved around the following points, many of which were also discussed in Lloyd:
1. Individual damages assessments cannot be circumvented by placing a cap on damages
that can be claimed by each class member.
This was the approach in Naken,71 which was also followed by the claimant in Lloyd. Naken
involved nearly 5,000 purchasers of certain models of vehicle. The plaintiffs capped damages
at $1,000 per member, which was stated to be an approximate reflection of the diminution of
resale value of the vehicles. However, just as the UKSC found in Lloyd, Justice Estey for the
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) held that damages would be different for each class member,
and that this could not be circumvented by capping each member’s claim.72 As in Lloyd, Justice
Estey held that res judicata would prevent those with more extensive damages from pursuing
their rights in subsequent actions, and that such a result ‘would be serious’.73 The
Newfoundland Supreme Court (Trial Division) came to a similar conclusion in Kelly.74
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ibid 1035, 1039.
ibid 1029-30, 1035, 1040.
71
Naken et al v General Motors of Canada Ltd et al, 1975 CanLII 498 (ONSC); revd 1977 CanLII 1317 (Div Ct);
revd (1979) 21 OR (2d) 780 (CA); revd Naken SCC (n 54).
72
Naken SCC, ibid 99.
73
ibid 100-101.
74
Kelly (n 60) [54], [67]-[69].
70

2. The ‘same interest’ test will not be met if individual damages assessments are necessary
because of the variety of class members’ circumstances.
This was the courts’ conclusion in both Naken and Lloyd.75 In Prince Edward Island, too, the
Supreme Court (Trial Division) refused to approve the settlement of a representative action
where damages could not be calculated without recourse to individual enquiries.76 As in Lloyd,
the PEI Supreme Court held that the distribution of the common fund using the pro-rata method
proposed by the plaintiffs meant that the compensation ‘may bear no similarity to their loss or
damages’,77 and would thereby contravene the compensatory principle. The court cited an
unreported Nova Scotia case in which convenience store owners/operators had allegedly lost
income due to the wrongful termination of agreements to operate video gambling machines.78
The plaintiffs based their claim for each class member on their own average monthly net
income from the terminals. However, Bateman J held that there was no basis for assuming the
plaintiffs’ income reflected that of the other convenience store operators. As the court held in
Lloyd, the only way to calculate the damage to the class in accordance with the compensatory
principle was to pursue the ‘bottom up’ approach – to look at the individual circumstances of
each class member, which was fatal to a representative action. There was no reliable way to
calculate the damages to the class from the top down, ie on an aggregate basis.79
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Lloyd (n 9) [87]; Naken SCC, ibid 99-100; Holtslag v Alberta, 2000 ABQB 351 [10]; Inshore Fishermen’s
Bonafide Defence Fund Association v Canada (1994), 132 NSR (2d) 370 (CA); Seafarers International (n 64).
76
Horne v Canada (Attorney General), [1995] PEIJ No 60 [27], [40]-[41].
77
ibid [28], [39]-[40].
78
Audenhove v Nova Scotia (September 9, 1994, NSJ 384), cited in Horne, ibid [45].
79
Lloyd (n 9) [86]-[87].

3. Differences between class members’ circumstances on liability will be fatal to a
representative action.
This was the holding in Naken and other Canadian cases.80 The contractual claim in Naken was
based on the defendant’s warranties to the class members, and Justice Estey found there was
an infinite variety of differences in GM’s representations in its advertisements as well as
individual class members’ reliance on them, such that there was no ‘same interest’ even though
the claims arose from the same vehicle model.81
In Newfoundland,82 the Kelly case involved the liquidation of an insurance company
and the cancellation of 22,000 policies, resulting in $20 million in unrefunded premiums.83 The
court held the claims did not involve the ‘same interest’ because they would necessitate
individual enquiries into when the insurance broker and the policyholders knew or ought to
have known of the company’s precarious financial situation, as well as the manner in which
the broker handled each class member’s premium payments,84 and this would require the class
‘to be significantly redefined and reshaped as the evidence comes out.’85
In Holtslag, too, the court stated that the issues of reliance and the relevant standard of
care varied between class members.86 In order to overcome these variances, the representative
plaintiff would have to have the ‘lowest common denominator characteristic’, ie to have
purchased a home without actual reliance on the defendant’s approval of the roofing material.87
Just as in Lloyd, the court held that this could prove prejudicial, from a res judicata perspective,
to those class members who did rely on the defendant’s approval.88
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Kripps v Touche, Ross & Co, 1986 CanLII 758 (BCSC) [15]; Hayes v British Columbia Television Broadcasting
Systems Ltd, 1990 CanLII 1525 (BCCA); Interclaim Holdings Ltd v Down, 1999 ABQB 892 [30].
81
Naken SCC (n 54) 103-104.
82
All references to Newfoundland are to Newfoundland and Labrador.
83
Kelly (n 60) [4]-[11].
84
ibid [61]-[64].
85
ibid [58]; Inshore Fishermen (n 75) 378.
86
Holtslag (n 75) [13]-[14], [17]-[21], [23]-[25].
87
ibid [18].
88
ibid [19]-[20].

4. Conflicts within the class will be fatal to a representative action.
The Canadian case law held that ‘[n]one of the members of the class may have an interest
antagonistic to the other members.’89 While this issue did not arise in Naken, it was key to
some other cases. In Horne, for example, the plaintiffs were asking the court to approve a
settlement that would be binding on those who had objected or not consented to it, but who
may have had damages in excess of their pro-rata share of the settlement fund. The court held
that the differences in class members’ circumstances with regard to damages meant their
interests were necessarily antagonistic.90 As discussed below, however, a representative action
can proceed if the class members’ interests are merely divergent.91
5. Courts applying the restrictive approach called for class action reform by way of
legislation.
The Naken court agreed with the Ontario Law Reform Commission in holding that ‘the skeletal
nature of Rule 75 suffers from a host of procedural deficiencies that … can be addressed only
by wholesale reform of the law of class actions in Ontario.’92 The Holtslag court expressed
similar sentiments.93 In Lloyd, too, the UKSC ‘agree[d] with the highest courts of Australia,
Canada and New Zealand that … a detailed legislative framework would be preferable’.94
However, the UKSC’s ultimate conclusion on this point was more liberal than the SCC’s in
Naken, as will be discussed in the next section.
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Caisse Populaire (n 51), cited in Horne (n 76) [24].
Horne, ibid [24], [35]-[38].
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Part III will discuss the Canadian courts’ more expansive interpretation of the
representative rule in the 1970s, as well as the SCC’s decision in Dutton that permitted the
rule’s use for class actions.
Part III: Canada’s Expansive Approach
Canadian courts became more receptive to collective redress mechanisms in the 1970s,
following the introduction of class actions for damages in the US, and as the need for such
mechanisms became more apparent. The first signs of a more expansive interpretation of the
representative rule were seen in British Columbia, where such actions were governed by
Ordinance 16, Rule 9 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (1961).95 This was very similarly
worded to its counterparts in other provinces and was almost identical to its English equivalent.
This expansive interpretation consisted of two strands. The first was the adoption of the
‘common success’ test; the second consisted of courts’ interpretations of the rule to bypass the
restrictions of Markt.96 Each of these strands will be addressed in turn, with comparisons to
Lloyd throughout.
The BC Court of Appeal adopted the ‘common success’ test in Shaw v Real Estate
Board of Greater Vancouver.97 A group of estate agents brought a representative action for an
accounting, alleging the defendant had wrongfully withheld portions of their sales
commissions. The Court of Appeal held the matter was properly constituted as a representative
action, even though it sought the return of sums that differed for each group member, because
the relief sought was equitable and not for personal damages. In addition, the court found that
the ‘same interest’ requirement was satisfied by the group members’ common interest in the
success of the action.98 Similarly, in Chastain v British Columbia Hydro and Power
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Authority,99 the plaintiff sought a declaration that the defendant had no authority to request a
security deposit from new customers with low incomes, as well as an injunction forbidding the
defendant from keeping deposits already collected. The court allowed the representative action
to proceed, even though it was essentially a claim for a monetary remedy that would require
the return of different amounts to each customer, because the group members all had the ‘same
interest’ in the success of the action. In the Ontario case of Cobbold v Time Canada,100 the
court held that a claim for damages was not fatal to a representative action because the primary
consideration was common success.101
Lloyd did not adopt the ‘common success’ test. The UKSC held that the class members
all had the same interest in the claim, because the individual claims raised common issues and
there was no conflict of interest among the class members. However, the representative action
included a damages claim and, because the class members’ damages required individualised
assessment, the ‘same interest’ test was not met. It was not sufficient that ‘if the plaintiff wins
the other persons he purports to represent win too’,102 because there was no principled way of
calculating the damage to the class.
The second way in which the representative rule was interpreted more liberally in
Canada was in the courts’ approval of such actions, even where assessing damages would
potentially be complex and cumbersome, and where individual issues would remain to be
answered after a decision on the common questions. In Ranjoy Sales & Leasing v Deloitte,103
the class members’ investments varied in nature, the alleged deficiencies in the financial
statements varied by year, and the consequences of class members’ reliance (ie damages)
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would therefore vary by year.104 Nevertheless, the court held that ‘it would be premature to
refuse a class action because those or other distinctions might arise during the proceedings …
The better procedure would be to redefine the class to exclude any persons where there is
evidence … that indicates that such a person may be prejudiced if included in the class.’105
This was a much more liberal approach than in Kelly and Inshore Fishermen, which held that
it was not appropriate for the class to be significantly redefined as the evidence came out.106
In two Alberta cases, the courts held that a representative action could proceed even
though each class member’s damages would be different. In Korte v Deloite, Haskins & Sells,
a securities action, the court held that individual damages calculations were not a barrier to
proceeding and that reliance could be addressed in common (because the claims of breach of
fiduciary duty meant that proving actual reliance might not be necessary).107 In Alberta Pork
Producers, a representative action for price-fixing in the hog industry, the court found a
commonality among class members who all belonged to the plaintiff marketing board and sold
their hogs through the same scheme.108 The damages for each class member would be different,
but the court held that the same methodology could be used to establish the quantum of
damages for each class member.109 The Court of Appeal upheld the decision,110 holding that
the Supreme Court had distinguished this case from Naken111 because the issue of determining
the common fund and individual members’ entitlements was common across the class. This
was enough to establish a ‘common interest’.112
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In Farnham v Fingold,113 a representative action was brought on behalf of noncontrolling shareholders who claimed they had been unjustly deprived of a premium that was
paid to the controlling shareholders upon the sale of the company. They sought a declaration,
an accounting, and damages, consisting of a pro-rata share of the gross premium above market
price received by the controlling shareholders. The court held the premium could be calculated
without recourse to individualised enquiries, and that each class member’s individual share
could be established in post-trial proceedings.
Similarly, the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Naken held the representative action could
proceed (although this was overturned on appeal to the SCC) even though the claims involved
individual contracts and individual questions of reliance. The court held there was a common
interest among the class members who had relied on GM’s advertisements, and the class would
have to be narrowed to include only those people. Damages could therefore be sought in the
aggregate and individual assessments would not be required. The ‘same interest’ test did not
pose a barrier to proceeding, because individual questions of reliance could be determined after
a trial of the common questions.114
The approach in Farnham and Naken has echoes of the bifurcated approach used in
Prudential and endorsed in Lloyd, whereby a declaration of liability would form the basis for
subsequent individual actions for monetary damages, although in Farnham and Naken the
proposed post-trial proceedings would not involve separate actions.115 In addition, the
Canadian cases discussed above held, like Lloyd, that representative actions could be brought
even where they involved redress for individual private rights. In Alberta Pork Producers, the
court distinguished between an ‘offensive accumulation’ of claims (eg an action requiring an
individual assessment of each class member’s damages), and ‘a proper combining of individual
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causes of action’.116 It held that an aggregate damages assessment would not be ‘offensive’
simply because it would equal the total of each class member’s individual damages, as long as
no individualised assessments were required.117
There is also some overlap between Lloyd and the SCC’s decision in Dutton.118 Dutton
was an appeal from an Alberta decision. Although Naken had stopped the liberal interpretation
of the representative rule in its tracks, the Alberta courts had distinguished Naken in several
key cases.119 Alberta was also one of the last provinces to enact class proceedings legislation,
so its jurisprudence on the representative action was fairly well developed. It was therefore an
Alberta case that led the SCC to reconsider its position on the representative action nearly two
decades after Naken.
The SCC in Dutton not only upheld the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision allowing
the action to proceed; it overturned Naken and held the representative rule could be used to
prosecute class actions. In doing so, it modified the requirements for a representative action:120
1.
2.
3.
4.

The class is capable of clear definition;
There are issues of law or fact common to all class members;
Success for one class member means success for all; and
The proposed representative adequately represents the interests of
the class.

There was no longer any requirement, as there had been throughout the case law, that ‘[n]o
individual assessment of the claims of individual plaintiffs need be made.’121 The court held
that countervailing considerations that may outweigh the benefits of a class action had to be
considered, with a balance to be struck between efficiency and fairness.122 It also articulated
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the requirements for notice (including the right to opt out) and the consideration of individual
issues.123
The court found the class action was no longer an untested procedure.124 Ontario, BC,
and other jurisdictions had passed class actions legislation since Naken, and the court held that,
when interpreting the representative rules of the various provinces, attention should be paid to
that legislation.125 In holding that the representative rule could be used for class actions, even
where individualised assessments of damages were required,126 the SCC erased the distinction
between the two procedures.
The UKSC in Lloyd did not go so far. The balance of this section will compare and
contrast the decisions in Lloyd and Dutton; this reveals that the interpretation of the
representative rule in Lloyd is more expansive than in Naken, but more restrictive than in
Dutton. Those restrictions, I argue, are based on an accurate reading of the jurisprudence and
the nature of the representative rule that the Dutton court did not fully apprehend. The two
decisions are similar in several ways:
1. Both courts approached the representative rule in a liberal and purposive manner, and
stated that, in the absence of comprehensive legislation, courts had to fill the void under
their inherent power to settle the rules of practice and procedure.127
2. In filling this void, both courts provided guidance regarding steps such as notice and
opting out.128
3. Both courts held that conflicting interests were fatal to a representative action, but
divergent interests or differences between class members were not.129
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4. Finally, both courts anticipated that individual issues would remain to be resolved
following the answering of the common questions.130
The main difference between the two decisions is their treatment of the issue of damages.
Dutton permitted the use of the representative rule even where individualised damages
assessments would be required,131 and in doing so referred to the Ontario and BC class
proceedings legislation that stated that such circumstances were not a bar to a class action.132
Lloyd, by contrast, held that where damages are different for each individual, the
compensatory principle requires an individualised assessment – anything else will not put the
claimant in the same position as if the wrong had not occurred.133 While the court noted that
the compensatory principle had been ‘radically alter[ed]’ in other contexts,134 namely, under
the statute allowing for class actions in competition law,135 a rule of procedure could not be
used to abrogate the ‘nature of the remedy of damages at common law.’136
In all other respects, however, the UKSC’s description of the scope of the representative
action was similar to the SCC’s in Dutton. The UKSC in Lloyd overturned other strictures on
the representative rule, such as the bar to separate causes of action and diverging interests. It
also overturned the holding that a representative claim could not be maintained if damage was
an element of the cause of action,137 because the bifurcated approach could be used (with the
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common questions to be determined in one action, with subsequent individual actions to
determine the fact and amount of damage)138 or the class definition amended as appropriate.139
What explains the two courts’ different approaches to the issue of damages? As noted
above, the UKSC in Lloyd implied that the compensatory principle could only be ‘radically
alter[ed]’ by statute. Various law reform reports have also recognised that using the
representative rule for a class action would involve changes to the substantive law, including
the use of aggregate damages, and legislation would therefore be required.140 The Lloyd court
therefore recognised two crucial points: the distinction between the representative rule and
class actions, and the limits of its own power to erase that distinction.
The SCC in Dutton, on the other hand, did not consider the compensatory principle
when removing the bar on cases involving individual damages assessments. Instead, it simply
stated that this and other factors ‘should no more bar a class action suit in Alberta than in
Ontario or British Columbia’,141 despite the existence of class actions legislation in the latter
provinces, and despite the court’s prior decision in Naken. Underlying the Dutton decision and
accelerating the acceptance of class actions were the numerous legal, political, and social
changes that had, in the two decades since Naken, fundamentally altered the civil justice system
as well as the perception of the courts’ role in society. These changes have been detailed
elsewhere.142 They include the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,143
which entailed a more activist judiciary with the ability to strike down legislation. In this
context, even if the SCC had considered the compensatory principle, it would not have
considered abrogating it an impermissible step.
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Furthermore, part of the court’s reasoning in allowing the representative rule to be used
for class actions was the fact that ‘many jurisdictions have enacted comprehensive class action
legislation.’144 This assessment had the opposite effect than on the Naken court, which held
that, ‘[t]he experiences and practices elsewhere sometimes properly restrain judicial ardour to
ease the way of litigants by broader interpretation of a statute or regulation, particularly an
older one, where its language is either sufficiently broad or ambiguous to do so.’145 Much had
changed in the decades between the two decisions.
It can be seen, therefore, that Lloyd demonstrates a liberal approach to the representative
rule, while remaining within the limits of the compensatory principle. It is more generous than
Naken, and more principled than Dutton. Where does that leave England’s representative rule?
Part IV: The Representative Rule Post-Lloyd
At first glance, it would seem that the bifurcated approach endorsed in Lloyd leaves a
significant amount of space for class actions at common law. However, the issue of funding,
which is a central consideration in collective redress, puts severe limitations on that approach.
As the court in Lloyd noted, the claimant had not proposed a bifurcated process because a
declaration at the first stage would not generate any financial return. Only individual actions
for damages at the second stage would do so, and that would require each class member to take
active steps to pursue their claims.146 The number of claims – and therefore the pool of potential
damages – would be much lower in such an ‘opt-in’ process than an opt-out process, not only
because of lack of awareness of the proceedings but also because of ‘the natural human
tendency to do nothing when faced with a choice which requires positive action’.147 In addition,
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the administrative costs of commencing a claim, the costs of obtaining evidence from each
individual to prove their claim, and the low amount of compensation that would probably be
awarded,148 means the second stage of an action such as Lloyd would not be economically
viable, would not attract funding, and would probably not be pursued at all.
The bifurcated approach would therefore only be viable where individual actions for
damages would generate enough of a financial return to attract funding. Such cases can already
be pursued through the GLO framework, whereby numerous individual claims are collected on
a group register, and common or related issues of fact or law pertaining to those claims can be
addressed in one proceeding.149 This includes data protection claims.150 The GLO mechanism
arguably renders the bifurcated approach otiose, as can be seen in the Jalla case.151
The Nigerian claimants in Jalla commenced a representative action under CPR 19.6,
seeking remediation to damage to their land allegedly caused by an oil spill. In a back-to-front
version of the bifurcated approach, the claimants were already pursuing their individual
damages claims in separate actions.152 The Court of Appeal endorsed Prudential’s bifurcated
approach,153 stating that it was appropriate where the individual issues were subsidiary to the
common issues. In this case, however, the Court of Appeal held that the remediation claims
could not be justified without recourse to individual issues of causation, loss, damage, and
limitation,154 and those individual issues were therefore integral to the main issue in the
proceedings.155 As a result, one of the purposes of the representative rule – to avoid cost, delay,
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and procedural complexity – would be defeated.156 The case could not therefore proceed as a
representative action. As the Court of Appeal noted, however, more than 28,000 of the
claimants had commenced individual actions for damages. They could therefore have pursued
their claims through the ‘opt-in’ mechanism of the GLO.157
A GLO can capture claims that are economically viable, whether or not the individual
issues are subsidiary to the common issues.158 There are therefore very few cases that would
be suitable for the bifurcated approach, that would not also be suitable for a GLO. The main
difference between the two procedures is the stage at which the common issues are answered.
In a GLO, claimants begin to join the register before they are answered (although, depending
on the cut-off date, they may also join the register afterwards).159 Under the bifurcated
approach, on the other hand, individual claimants do not need to come forward until after the
common questions are answered. This would increase the incentive and reduce the risk of
commencing an individual action for damages, which could result in more claimants than a
more ‘front-end’ opt-in scheme.
Such an argument lies on shaky ground, however, given the experience of the one action
that was commenced under the opt-in competition law collective redress regime, which enabled
organisations to represent groups of consumers in the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT).160
The regime was limited to ‘follow-on’ actions, where an infringement of competition law had
already been established. The only action to be pursued under the regime was against JJB
Sports Plc for overcharging consumers for replica football shirts. Despite the reduced risk and
increased incentive of opting-in to a follow-on action, as well as extensive publicity, only 130
claimants opted in (0.00067–0.00083 per cent of the total affected).161
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It was this experience that led the Office of Fair Trading, and later the Department for
Business, Innovation and Skills, to recommend the introduction of opt-out class actions in
competition law.162 The result was Schedule 8 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015.163 For the
prosecution of competition law claims, the CAT class actions regime is preferable to a
bifurcated procedure under the representative rule for two reasons. First, CAT proceedings can
be pursued on an opt-out basis,164 so that individual claims do not have to be economically
viable and it is easier to attract funding. Second, section 47C of the CA 1998 departs expressly
from the compensatory principle and allows liability can be established on a class-wide basis,
so that individual class members are not required to establish loss even if this is an essential
element of their claim.165 In Mastercard, this meant the claim could proceed even though the
calculation of damages per class member could not be done with precision.166 In Lloyd, by
contrast, the lack of precision and necessary departure from the compensatory principle was
fatal to the representative action.167
The bifurcated approach therefore has very little utility, given the procedural
alternatives available for the prosecution of numerous claims that share common issues of fact
or law. What gaps does that leave in terms of collective redress procedures? Lloyd has the
answer: unless they claim damages that can be assessed without recourse to individual
enquiries (in which case the representative rule would be available), there is still no procedure
for the prosecution of numerous claims that share common issues of fact or law that are not
individually economically viable. Lord Woolf noted this gap in his Access to Justice report, in
which he stated that the new procedures he proposed for multi-party actions should, amongst
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other things, ‘provide access to justice where large numbers of people have been affected by
another’s conduct, but individual loss is so small that it makes an individual action
economically unviable’.168 More than two decades later, except for the area of competition law,
that gap remains unfilled.
Part V: Conclusion
The future does not look bright for England’s representative rule. Because of the limits on how
that rule may be used, even after the UKSC’s judgment in Lloyd, it is likely to remain a
‘procedural backwater’.169 The same was true in Canada before the passage of class
proceedings legislation, despite courts’ attempts to interpret the rule liberally. In the wake of
the SCC’s decision in Dutton,170 several provinces saw actions commenced under their version
of the representative rule.171 Because of the lack of guidance provided by the rule, however,
the actions became mired in procedural complexity and interlocutory appeals. In response to
these difficulties, each province commenced its own class proceedings legislation, with Prince
Edward Island being the last.172 Where the representative rule continues to exist in Canada, its
use is largely limited to claims made by limited and clearly ascertainable classes of persons,
asserting a common statutory or collective right, or those who seek a common statutory
declaration or remedy.173
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England’s representative rule is therefore likely to suffer a similar fate. Lloyd has
‘somewhat sidelined’ the use of the rule for data breach claims,174 and in February 2021 the
UK government decided not to introduce an opt-out class action regime under the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR).175 Generic class action legislation is unlikely to be introduced,
given the government’s response to prior proposals.176 Nevertheless, as recent experience in
Ontario has demonstrated, class action reform is not a linear process.177 English reformers with
a comparative eye may therefore learn from the twists and turns that class actions in Ontario
and other Canadian jurisdictions have taken, and craft a regime that fits more closely to the
needs of their own jurisdiction.
There are also indications that class actions legislation will be introduced in sectors
outside of competition law. For example, the Department for Business, Energy, and Industrial
Strategy is considering opening up further avenues to collective redress for UK consumers.178
In light of Lloyd, and as evidenced by the increasing number of cases being commenced in the
CAT, legislation is the only realistic way to establish a thriving class actions regime in England.
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